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ABSTRACT: In answering the question, "Which moral identity has to be developed in a multicul- 
tural society?" we draw a distinction between public and non-public identities of persons. On our 
view, a liberal democracy is characterized by a specific onception of these two central components 
of moral identity. In section 2, we concentrate on the public identity, while, in section 3, the non- 
public identity is the centre of interest. In explaining these main components of moral identity, we 
will appeal to those aspects of identity as set out by Rorty & Wong which are constitutive of moral 
identity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM 
The issue we want to raise in this contribution concerns the moral identity of 
persons in a multicultural society. Multiculturality implies, by definition, a moral 
pluralism, that is to say, a variety of incompatible and conflicting conceptions of 
the good life. Given such a pluralistic society, we pose the question, "Which 
requirements, if any, apply to the moral identity of persons, not only with regard 
to their more personal sphere of life, but also concerning their role as citizens?" 
This question must be understood as a typical educational question. What we 
aim at in education is the cultivation and development of a certain moral iden- 
tity. In other words, our question is, "If we want to prepare our children for a life 
in a multicultural society, which moral identity should be our aim of education?" 
Answering this question self-evidently depends on specific, normative start- 
ing-points. The perspective that we take as a starting-point is modern democratic 
liberalism, in particular, the political iberalism that is defended in recent publi- 
cations by John Rawls (1993). This implies that we will explore which moral 
identity best 'fits' a liberal democracy. To put it yet another way, we are trying to 
find an answer to the question, "What demands hould a liberal-democratic society 
make on the development of the moral identity of children?" 
In our analysis we will make use of the distinctions that are made by Am61ie 
Rorty & David Wong (1990) between different components oraspects of the iden- 
tity of persons. In the first place, the identity of a person is partially determined 
by his or her somatic dispositions. Since such characteristics will influence, for 
example, the posture, gesticulation, and pattern of movement of persons (slender 
and graceful, fat and clumsy), every culture has certain social (and aesthetic) 
norms for somatic dispositions. Therefore, defining the identity of the other - as 
well as oneself-  is partially dependent on these somatic dispositions. 
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A second aspect of personal identity mentioned by Rorty & Wong (1990) 
consists in temperamental and psychological qualities. The way in which people 
judge this component of identity, both that of themselves and of others, is exten- 
sively analyzed in modem personality theory. Through factor-analysis of such 
judgements, the same five personality dimensions are always found. These so- 
called 'Big Five' are generally described using such terms as 'extraversion', 'agree- 
ableness', conscientiousness', 'neuroticism', and 'intellect' or 'openness to expe- 
rience' (Hofstee, 1990). 
According to Rorty & Wong (1990), social role and socially-defined group iden- 
tity are also important aspects of personal identity. Social role is tied up with 
societal institutions and practices (family, profession, etc.), while group identity, 
which is often associated with stereotypical traits, is connected with ethnicity, 
religious community, class, age or gender. 
Finally, the ideal identity or ideal self is a component of identity that consists 
in identification with a value-system or with certain ideals. According to Harry 
Frankfurt, the identity of persons is even intrinsically connected with ideals which 
need not necessarily be moral in nature. Frankfurt writes, "If someone has no 
ideals, there is nothing that he can bring himself to do. Moreover, since no- 
thing is necessary to him, there is nothing that he can be said essentially to be" 
(Frankfurt, 1993, p. 25). 
Our line of reasoning will be as follows. In our answer to the question, "Which 
moral identity has to be developed in a multicultural society?" we will make a 
distinction between public and non-public identities of persons. 1 We will try to 
make it plausible that a liberal democracy is characterized by a specific concep- 
tion of these two central components of moral identity. In section 2 we concen- 
trate on the public identity, while in section III the nonpublic identity is the 
centre of interest. In the explanation of these main components ofmoral identity, 
we will appeal to the aspects of Rorty & Wong (1990) already described. How- 
ever, not all of these aspects are constitutive of moral identity. This is especially 
true for somatic dispositions and temperamental qualities. Therefore, in our 
analysis of the public and nonpublic moral identity, these aspects will be left out 
of consideration. 
U. PUBLIC MORAL IDENTITY 
In political philosophy, a distinction is drawn between the so-called public and 
the nonpublic domain. The public domain is defined as the field of legitimate 
state interference (in the form of legislation), whilst the nonpublic domain con- 
ceres the field in which the citizen is offered the freedom of living her life 
according to her own conception of the good. 
There are different opinions with regard to what is considered to be part of the 
public or nonpublic domain. In other words, the concepts of 'public' and 'non- 
public' are filled in with the help of different normative conceptions. Typical of 
a liberal democratic society is the idea that public morality is relatively small, 
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and that, consequently, the nonpublic morality is correspondingly broad. In illiberal 
societies, on the other hand, the relation is precisely the reverse: public morality 
- and, with that, the field of state interference - is comprehensive, while the 
scope for living one's life according to one's own values is limited and, some- 
times, virtually absent. In a theocratic society (such as Iran, for example) (broad) 
public morality comprises far-reaching prescriptions concerning clothing and 
appearance, the division of roles between the sexes, the media, and, of course, 
the arts as well. Even capital punishment was decreed for an author on the basis 
of a literary text. 
Now what is the content of that small liberal morality? In the first place, public 
morality in a Western democracy comprises a group of relatively concrete and 
elementary ules (cf. Spiecker & Steutel, 1995). The general observance of the 
rules we have in mind here forms a central condition for every minimally tolera- 
ble form of social ife, including the illiberal and undemocratic variants. Therefore, 
the public morality in a liberal society will include a complex of rules aiming to 
protect he elementary interests of the members of society by inhibiting certain 
forms of behavior, in particular, expressions of aggression, hostility, and greed 
(cf. Mackie, 1977, pp. 107-111). In this connection, Richard Peters (1981) speaks 
about basic rules. As examples, he mentions the rules which oblige us to observe 
contracts, to respect collective or individual property, to avoid inflicting unnec- 
essary physical injury, and also to care for the younger generation. The positive 
obligation to offer help that does not put a great strain on us but produces great 
benefit o our fellows can be considered as a basic rule as well. 
Although the interpretation f basic rules varies from culture to culture, such 
rules are in fact universal in character. Corresponding with basic rules are specific 
human objectives and social practices that are considered to be of importance in
every minimally tolerable society, including the protection of life against aggres- 
sion and such other miseries as pain, illness, death and hunger. Despite all differ- 
ences in their conceptions of the good life, people will, given the vulnerability of 
human existence, consider theft, cruelty, rape, robbery and arson to be evils. "All 
ways of life require protection against he great evils, even though different con- 
ceptions of the good may rank their prevention i  very different orders of prior- 
ity" (Hampshire, 1989, p. 91). Consequently, to keep life in a society livable 
and tolerable, people will have to impart o their children the capacity and the 
willingness to observe basic rules at all times. These are, at any rate, the mental 
dispositions that form part of the desired public moral identity in a liberal demo- 
cratic society. 
Moreover, in Western democracies, the public morality comprises a number 
of basic rights (and the corresponding duties to respect hese rights). Here, we 
refer in particular to the classical civic liberties (such as freedom of thought and 
liberty of conscience) and the political-democratic rights (such as the right to 
vote and the right to run for public office). These basic rights correspond to the 
well-lfxlown civic virtues, in particular, the virtues of tolerance, non-discrimina- 
tion, reasonableness and democratic attitudes, including the willingness to com- 
promise. A person who has acquired these virtues is able and willing to support 
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and respect the basic rights. These mental dispositions also form part of the public 
moral identity of persons in a liberal-democratic society. And, again, an impor- 
tant aim of education is indicated here: we should make clear to the child - as 
future citizen - what a liberal democracy really is, and what this requires of 
people living and working in it. 
The public morality of our multicultural society, we can summarize, consists 
of basic rules and basic rights. Basic rules underlie all minimally tolerable forms 
of social life, including the illiberal. Thus, an ethically relativistic attitude with 
regard to such rules is out of place. Basic rights on the other hand, are only widely 
respected in liberal societies. In spite of this, to citizens of a multicultural so- 
ciety, a culturally relativistic point of view with regard to our liberal-democratic 
achievements will also be unacceptable. An important aspect of our personal 
identity corresponds to the described rules and rights: the desired public moral 
identity in a multicultural society. After the recent violence against ethnic groups 
in Germany, Uganda, and the former Yugoslavia, we have a notion of what the 
absence of such a public morality can imply. 
Let us now connect our outline of the public moral identity with the aspects of 
personal identity that are distinguished by Rorty & Wong. First, it turns out that 
this public identity is connected with a specific social role, namely, our role as 
citizens. A particular feature of this social role is that no one can escape from it. 
At birth, one automatically becomes a (future) citizen of a society, either by 
blood-relationship (Germany) or by place of birth (France). In a liberal-democ- 
ratic society, the role of citizen is laid down by basic rules and basic rights. And 
the aspect of our identity that is connected with this role is composed of mental 
dispositions that correspond to these rules and rights. 
Secondly, we can consider the public moral identity as a special form of group 
identity, namely, an identity that we share with all fellow-citizens. It is the common 
identity of the group of citizens in a liberal-democratic society. Citizenship, 
according to Kymlicka and Norman, is not just a certain status, defined by a set 
of rights and responsibilities, but "It is also an identity, an expression of one's 
membership n a political community" (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 369). The 
oft-expressed complaint hat modern society is fragmented and individualized 
needs, therefore, to be relativized. Rawls rightly claims that citizens in a well- 
ordered society, in which justice is conceived as fairness, do have final aims in 
common (cf. Rawls, 1993, p. 202). Whilst these citizen do not affirm the same 
substantial doctrine of the good, they do share basic ends, in particular, the end 
of supporting institutions and relationships that meet basic rights and basic rules. 
It is wrong, according to Macedo, to assume that only substantial conceptions 
of the good can furnish persons with common ends: "Justice furnishes liberal 
citizens with ends capable of imparting a deep and noble unity to liberal com- 
munity" (Macedo, 1992, p. 219). In a properly functioning liberal democracy, 
public moral identity is a binding and unity-creating element. Given our expla- 
nation, this identity is less "thin" than some communitarians want us to believe. 
In any case, the public identity certainly is not an 'unencumbered self' (Sandel, 
1982, p. 182). On the contrary, it is a social self that is rooted in the long tradi- 
tion of liberal democracy. 
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III. NONPUBLIC MORAL IDENTITY 
In Western democracies the public morality is rather small. This implies that the 
nonpublic domain, that is to say, the field of thought and action in which the 
state has no right of coercive control, is relatively broad. In a liberal-democratic 
society this 'free space' is guaranteed and protected by the small morality, in 
particular, by basic liberties such as freedom of movement, freedom of speech, 
freedom of press and so on. Ultimately, it is shared public moral identity that 
enables and maintains the broad nonpublic domain. 
In a liberal democracy, public morality prescribes only in a limited manner 
how we are to arrange our lives. The members of such a society, whether or not 
they are joining a particular tradition, will themselves have to develop a nonpub- 
tic morality. In the relevant literature such a relatively broad morality is gener- 
ally called a "conception of the good life". According to Rawls, such a concep- 
tion consists of a more or less determinate scheme of final aims, that is, of aims 
that we think intrinsically worthwhile, as well as of attachments and loyalties 
with regard to persons, groups, and associations. Moreover, a conception of the 
good is closely associated with a religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine, by 
reference to which we understand the value and the significance of our ends, 
attachments and loyalties (cf. Rawls, 1993, pp. 19-20, 74, 108, 302). 
The nonpublic moral identity can be explained in terms of a conception of the 
good. In other words, what constitutes our nonpublic moral identity are aims that 
we think worthwhile striving after and attachments with other persons, groups 
and associations which we think important o maintain. Moral education in a 
multicultural society consequently does not only consist of civic education, that 
is, education for good citizenship. We also have to help and support he child to 
develop his (personal) conception of the good life. 
Let us now return to the aspects of personal identity distinguished by Rorty & 
Wong (1990). In the first place, the nonpublic moral identity, obviously, must be 
understood in terms of the ideal self How we define our own nonpubfic identity 
is, at any rate, a function of the conception of the good with which we identify 
and from which we will organize our life. According to Charles Taylor, there is an 
essential connection between our identity, our sense of self, and our sense of the 
good (Taylor, 1989, p. 41). The question "Who am I?" can only be understood and 
answered from a moral framework: "To know who I am is a species of knowing 
where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications 
whic]a provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case 
to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or 
oppose" (ibid., p. 27). In short, we only have a nonpubfic morality to the extent 
that we succeed in committing ourselves to a specific onception of the good life. 
In the second place, we can connect he nonpubfic moral identity with the 
aspect called 'group identity' by Rorty & Wong (1990). To the extent hat we 
share our conception of the good life with others, our personal nonpublic identity 
coincides with a specific group identity. If we consider ourselves, for example, 
to be Protestant, Muslim, Socialist or Humanist, then we have in mind that aspect 
of our identity that we share with particular groups in society. 
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A specific component of group identity is national identity. A person identi- 
fies herself as a member of a community with its own language, culture and 
history. Citizens of a liberal democracy can have different national identities, like 
the Basks and Catalans in Spain and the Flemish and Walloons in Belgium (cf. 
Tamir, 1992). On our view, however, many aspects of this national identity 
should not be regarded as components of the moral (group) identity. 
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our main question was "If we want to prepare our children for a life in a multi- 
cultural society, then what moral identity ought o be our aim in education?" Our 
answer is that, in a liberal democracy, moral education must consist of two 
aspects. On the one hand, we should cultivate a public identity in our children. 
We have to impart to the young the dispositions that will make them able and 
willing to respect basic rules and basic rights. This aim of education, the specific 
civic component, is in principle the same for all children, regardless of their 
ethnic, cultural or national background. On the other hand, we should also help 
our children to develop their nonpublic identity, that is to say, we must support 
our children in finding a substantial conception of the good life. In a multicul- 
tural society, the content of this aim of moral education will vary considerably 
among groups. 
However, what is also typical of a liberal-democratic society is the specific 
relation between public and nonpublic omponents of moral identity. The small 
public morality indicates, as it were, the limits within which practising concep- 
tions of the good is allowed. To use the words of Rawls, "'the Right' has priority 
over 'the Good'" (Rawls, 1993). Therefore, in upbringing and education, children 
must be taught hat they are not to identify with conceptions which are contrary 
to the liberal small morality. An example of such a conception is a fundamental- 
istic religious view of life. He who has acquired such a conception will pay little 
respect o liberal basic rights and can even commit errorist acts against fellow 
citizens or the state. Another example concerns groups in which only their own 
extended family, tribe or ethnic grouping defines their moral identity (so-called 
a-moral familism). In all these cases of moral development, the desired ifferen- 
tiation between public and nonpublic omponents of the identity is stagnated. 
Philosophers have very often discussed the question to what extent persons in 
a liberal-democratic society should be able and willing to reflect critically on 
conceptions of the good life, including the conception imparted to them in their 
upbringing. Amy Gutmann, for example, is of the opinion that a liberal govern- 
ment "Must aid children in developing the capacity to understand and to evalu- 
ate competing conceptions of the good life" (Gutmann, 1987, p. 44). William 
Galston, on the other hand, thinks that liberal government has to guarantee pre- 
cisely the liberty "to live unexamined as well as examined lives" (Galston, 1991, 
p. 254). Regardless of one's opinion on these complicated matters, we definitely 
have to impart to our children the disposition to evaluate critically whether or 
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not conceptions of the good life exceed the bounds of public morality. Even 
though liberalism does not necessarily imply the ideal of critical reflection on 
conceptions of the good as such, giving priority to small morality implies that 
citizens should be able to distance themselves from their nonpublic identity in 
order to determine to what extent his identity conflicts with basic rules and basic 
rights (cf. Larmore, 1990, pp. 350-351). In short, moral education in a multicul- 
rural society requires not only the cultivation of a public and a nonpublic iden- 
tity, but also the stimulation of the disposition and the ability to adjust one's own 
nonpublic identity to the public morality. 
NOTE 
1 According to Rawls, citizens in a liberal society are characterized bytwo forms of identity, apublic 
(or political) and a nonpublic (or nonpolitical) identity. The public identity of these citizens is com- 
posed of two moral powers, a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of good. 
This stands in contrast with, for example, persons who live in a caste system. Their public identity is 
not dependent on a specific religion or social position and, therefore, remains the same when they 
convert from one religion to another or when their social position changes (Rawls, 1993, pp. 30-31). 
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